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Network-Constrained Stackelberg Game for Pricing Demand Flexibility in Power Distribution Systems

机译:用于配电系统中的定价需求灵活性的网络受限的Stackelberg游戏

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We propose a network-constrained Stackelberg game framework to set energy prices for flexible consumers in a distribution grid. In this set-up, an aggregator acts as the leader, setting energy prices for each node, and price-responsive consumers are the followers, adjusting their demand according to the price charged. We show that this problem has an equilibrium in which the optimal demands can be written as a function of the Lagrange multipliers of the problem. For each node, voltage and current shadow costs have a cumulative effect that depends both on the upstream path to the substation and on the downstream demand level. We compare the Stackelberg solution to a centralized approach which maximizes social welfare. Our analysis reveals that, although the system-level optimal demand is higher in the centralized case, some individual nodes have higher consumption in the Stackelberg game. This counter-intuitive result cannot be observed in network-free formulations commonly adopted in game-theoretic works on demand-side management, where a centralized approach benefits every individual consumer. Numerical studies on an IEEE 123-bus feeder provide a system-level and a node-level analysis of this problem, highlighting the effect of network constraints on the optimal demands, and comparing the Stackelberg and the centralized solutions.
机译:我们提出了一个网络受限的Stackelberg游戏框架,以便在分销网格中设置灵活消费者的能源价格。在此设置中,聚合者充当领导者,为每个节点的节能,以及价格响应消费者是追随者,根据收取的价格调整其需求。我们表明这个问题具有平衡,其中可以作为问题的拉格朗日乘数的函数写入最佳需求。对于每个节点,电压和电流阴影成本具有累积效果,其取决于变电站的上游路径和下游需求水平。我们将Stackelberg解决方案与一种最大化社会福利的集中方法进行比较。我们的分析揭示了,尽管集中式情况下系统级最优需求较高,但是一些个体节点在Stackelberg游戏中具有更高的消耗。在游戏理论作品上的无需侧管理中通常采用的无网络配方中不能观察到这种反向直观的结果,其中集中方法受益于每个个人消费者。 IEEE 123总线馈线的数值研究提供了该问题的系统级和节点级分析,突出了网络限制对最佳需求的影响,并比较了Stackelberg和集中解决方案。

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