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Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

机译:排队问题的防策略和匿名规则:公平与效率之间的关系

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摘要

We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kay? and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.
机译:我们在排队问题时考虑公平与效率之间的关系。我们证明,在策略可靠的情况下,福利中的匿名性意味着排队效率。此外,通过结合凯的结果?和Ramaekers(Games Econ Behav 68:220–232,2010)一起,我们还对满足策略验证,福利匿名和预算平衡的规则类别进行了描述。

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  • 来源
    《Social Choice and Welfare》 |2012年第3期|473-480|共8页
  • 作者单位

    Graduate School of Economics Kobe University 2-1 Rokkodai Nada Kobe Hyogo 657-8501 Japan;

    Faculty of Economics Kyoto Gakuen University 1-1 Nanjyo Otani Sogabe-cho Kameoka Kyoto 621-8555 Japan;

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