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The division problem with voluntary participation

机译:自愿参与的划分问题

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摘要

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this article we consider the division problem when agents’ participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents’ shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents’ voluntary participation.
机译:划分问题包括在一组具有潜在份额的单一说话偏好的代理商之间分配给定量的均质且完全可分割的商品。规则为每个除法问题提出了一个份额向量。文献隐含地假设代理将找到可接受的任何分配给他们的份额。在本文中,我们考虑了代理商自愿参与时的分工问题。每个代理都有一个可接受份额的特殊区间,其中他的偏好是单峰的。规则必须建议每个代理商不参与或接受可接受的份额,因为否则他将选择退出,这将需要重新分配一些剩余代理商的份额。我们研究了有效且一致的规则的子类,并描述了统一规则的扩展,这些扩展明确地处理了代理商的自愿参与。

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  • 来源
    《Social Choice and Welfare》 |2012年第3期|371-406|共36页
  • 作者单位

    Research Group in Economic Analysis Facultade de Económicas Universidade de Vigo 36310 Vigo (Pontevedra) Spain;

    Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica and CODE Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona) Spain;

    Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET Ejército de los Andes 950 5700 San Luis Argentina;

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