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Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment

机译:具有一维承诺的二维意识形态空间中的选举竞争

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摘要

We study a model of electoral competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to select (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two settings: one where both candidates are committed to the same dimension, and the other where each candidate is committed to a different dimension. We focus on characterisation and existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria when the core is empty. We show that if the distribution of voters’ ideal policies is continuously differentiable and has a bounded support, then an equilibrium exists if the candidates are differentiated enough. Our results for the case where the candidates have a common committed issue have implications for the literature on valence.
机译:我们研究了具有两个正交问题的两个候选人之间的选举竞争模型,其中候选人受办公室激励并致力于其中一个维度的特定职位,同时具有(可靠地)选择另一个维度上任何职位的自由。我们分析了两种设置:一种是将两个候选者都提交给同一维度,另一种是将每个候选者都提交给不同维度。当核心为空时,我们专注于纯策略纳什均衡的表征和存在。我们表明,如果选民理想政策的分配是连续可区分的,并且得到有限的支持,那么如果候选人之间的差异足够大,则存在均衡。当候选人存在共同的承诺问题时,我们的结果将对价的文献产生影响。

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  • 来源
    《Social Choice and Welfare》 |2011年第1期|1-24|共24页
  • 作者单位

    Institute of Informatics Faculty of Mathematics Informatics and Mechanics University of Warsaw Banacha 2 02-097 Warsaw Poland;

    Department of Economics University of Birmingham Edgbaston Birmingham B15 2TT UK;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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