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The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures

机译：易错组织的最优设计：最优决策准则的不变性和层次结构与多层次结构的唯一性

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摘要

We present a general framework to study the project selection problem in an organization of fallible decision-makers. We show that when the organizational size and the majority rule for project acceptance are optimized simultaneously, the optimal quality of decision-making, as determined by the decision criterion, is invariant, and depends only on the expertise of decision-makers. This result clarifies that the circumstances under which the decision-making quality varies with the organizational structure are situations where the organizational size or majority rule is restricted from reaching the optimal level. Moreover, in contrast to earlier findings in the literature that the hierarchy and the polyarchy are generally sub-optimal structures, we show that when the size, structure and decision criterion are simultaneously optimized, the hierarchy and the polyarchy are in fact the only possible optimal organizational structures when decision-making costs are present.
机译：我们提出了一个总体框架来研究一个容易出错的决策者组织中的项目选择问题。我们表明，当同时优化组织规模和项目验收的多数规则时，由决策标准确定的最优决策质量是不变的，并且仅取决于决策者的专业知识。该结果表明，决策质量随组织结构而变化的情况是限制组织规模或多数规则达到最佳水平的情况。此外，与文献中较早的发现相反，层次结构和多级结构通常是次优结构，我们表明，当同时优化大小，结构和决策标准时，层次结构和多级结构实际上是唯一可能的最优选择存在决策成本时的组织结构。

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