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首页> 外文期刊>Strategic Management Journal >External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions
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External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions

机译：外部公司治理与财务舞弊：代理理论处方的认知评估理论见解

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Research summary: Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard.Managerial summary: Many of us are familiar with stories about top managers cooking the books in one way or another. As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. Copyright (c) 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
机译：研究摘要：代理机构理论认为，外部治理机制（例如维权人士，公司控制市场，证券分析师）可以阻止经理人采取机会主义行动。使用认知评估理论，我们认为外部治理所施加的强大期望会影响高级管理人员的自治感，并挤出其内在动机，从而有可能导致财务欺诈。我们的发现表明，维权人士，公司控制市场和证券分析师的外部压力增加了经理人进行财务欺诈的可能性。我们的研究从高层管理者的角度考虑外部治理，并质疑代理理论的基本宗旨之一：施加于管理人员的外部压力减少了道德风险的可能性。方式或其他。结果，公司和监管机构经常实施严格的控制，以试图防止财务欺诈。然而，认知评估理论描述了那些外部控制实际上可能与预期效果相反的原因，因为它们剥夺了管理者适当行为的内在动机。我们发现情况确实如此。当高层管理者面对激进的股东，被收购的威胁或热心的证券分析师等更严格的外部控制机制时，他们实际上更有可能参与财务不良行为。版权所有（c）2016 John Wiley＆Sons，Ltd.

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