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Managerial response to constitutional constraints on shareholder power

机译：管理层对股东权力的宪法约束的回应

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Research summary: We examine whether top managers engage in misconduct, such as illegal insider trading, illegal stock option backdating, bribery, and financial manipulation, in response to the presence, or absence, of governance provisions that impose constitutional constraints on shareholder power. Within the agency framework, shareholders typically oppose governance provisions that limit their power because those provisions could undermine shareholder influence and increase agency costs. However, when shareholders support provisions that constrain their power, managers could respond positively by refraining from self-interested behavior in the form of managerial misconduct. We find this to be especially true in industries where these governance provisions are particularly relevant to managers and in scenarios where CEOs do not also serve as board chair.Managerial summary: In recent years, shareholders have become central to organizations and the managers who run them. Shareholders and managers establish a rapport with one another, such that the behavior of one affects the behavior of the other. One of the most consequential decisions shareholders can make pertains to the reach of their influence: They can choose to impose strict governance over firms they own or they can allow for constitutional constraints that limit shareholder power. When they act in the mutual interest of managers by allowing such constraints, we find that managers respond in kind by refraining from bad behavior, such as illegal stock options backdating, insider trading, and financial manipulation. This is especially true in industries and scenarios in which shareholder pressure is most relevant to managers. Copyright (c) 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
机译：研究摘要：我们调查高层管理者是否存在不当行为，例如非法的内幕交易，非法的股票期权回溯，贿赂和财务操纵，以应对是否存在对股东权力施加宪法约束的治理规定。在代理机构框架内，股东通常反对限制其权力的治理规定，因为这些规定可能会破坏股东的影响力并增加代理成本。但是，当股东支持限制其权力的条款时，管理者可以通过避免以管理不端行为的形式出现自利行为来做出积极回应。我们发现，在这些治理条款与管理人员特别相关的行业中以及在CEO不同时担任董事会主席的情况下，这一点尤为正确。管理摘要：近年来，股东已成为组织和管理它们的管理人员的核心。股东和经理之间建立了融洽的关系，因此一个人的行为会影响另一个人的行为。股东可以做出的最重要的决定之一与其影响力有关：他们可以选择对自己拥有的公司施加严格的治理，也可以允许限制股东权力的宪法约束。当他们通过允许此类约束为管理者的共同利益行事时，我们发现管理者会通过避免不良行为（例如违法的股票期权回溯，内幕交易和财务操纵）来做出回应。在股东压力与管理者最相关的行业和情况下尤其如此。版权所有（c）2016 John Wiley＆Sons，Ltd.

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