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Foreshadowing as Impression Management: Illuminating the Path for Security Analysts

机译：作为印象管理的前兆：为安全分析师开辟道路

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Research summary: Managers can disclose information to security analysts as a form of impression management, but doing so is problematic because competitors can use that same information at the expense of the firm. We identify an impression management technique we call foreshadowing, which refers to hinting about future potential strategic activity. Foreshadowing provides information of value to analysts that can influence their evaluations of a firm, but not so much information as to put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. We hypothesize and find that managers who foreshadow acquisition announcements receive fewer analyst downgrades following the announcements, especially when there is more analyst uncertainty about the firm. We also hypothesize and find that analysts' responses to foreshadowing positively influence the likelihood that managers eventually acquire other firms.Managerial summary: Security analysts are often suspicious when firms announce acquisitions as those announcements are cumbersome to analyze on short notice and raise questions about managerial motivations that might not represent the best interests of the firm. We find that managers can improve analyst reactions to acquisition announcements by disclosing some information of value to analystsspecifically by hinting that an acquisition could occur in the future. We refer to such hints as foreshadowing. Foreshadowing entails giving analysts information to reduce their suspicions and facilitate their analyses, but not so much information as to degrade the firm's competitive information advantage over other firms. Foreshadowing also allows managers the option to reconsider actually executing the acquisition if analysts respond negatively to its possibility. Copyright (c) 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
机译：研究摘要：管理者可以以印象管理的形式向安全分析师披露信息，但是这样做是有问题的，因为竞争者可以使用相同的信息而使公司付出代价。我们确定了一种称为前兆的印象管理技术，指的是暗示未来潜在的战略活动。预先准备可以为分析人员提供有价值的信息，这些信息可能会影响他们对公司的评估，但提供的信息不足以使公司处于竞争劣势。我们进行了假设，发现预示收购公告的经理在公告之后获得的分析师降级幅度较小，尤其是当分析师对公司的不确定性更高时。我们还进行假设并发现，分析师对预谋的反应对经理最终收购其他公司的可能性产生了积极影响。经理摘要：当公司宣布收购时，安全分析师通常会产生怀疑，因为这些公告很难在短时间内进行分析并提出有关管理动机的问题这可能并不代表公司的最大利益。我们发现，管理人员可以通过暗示可能会在将来进行收购，从而向分析师披露一些有价值的信息，从而提高分析师对收购公告的反应。我们称这种暗示为预兆。进行预备工作需要为分析师提供信息，以减少他们的怀疑并促进他们的分析，但提供的信息却不至于削弱公司相对于其他公司的竞争信息优势。如果分析师对收购的可能性做出否定的反应，则预谋还允许经理人选择重新考虑实际执行收购的可能性。版权所有（c）2017 John Wiley＆Sons，Ltd.

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