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Rip it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon

机译:撕开并重新开始:拒绝表征现象

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In this paper, I investigate the nature of empirical findings that provide evidence for the characterization of a scientific phenomenon, and the defeasible nature of this evidence. To do so, I explore an exemplary instance of the rejection of a characterization of a scientific phenomenon: memory transfer. I examine the reason why the characterization of memory transfer was rejected, and analyze how this rejection tied to researchers' failures to resolve experimental issues relating to replication and confounds. I criticize the presentation of the case by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who claim that no sufficient reason was provided to abandon research on memory transfer. I argue that skeptics about memory transfer adopted what I call a defeater strategy, in which researchers exploit the defeasibility of the evidence for a characterization of a phenomenon. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:在本文中,我调查了经验发现的性质,这些发现为科学现象的特征提供了证据,以及该证据的不可行性质。为此,我探讨了拒绝科学现象表征的一个示例性实例:内存传输。我研究了为什么拒绝对内存传输进行表征的原因,并分析了这种拒绝与研究人员未能解决与复制和混淆有关的实验性问题的失败有何关系。我批评哈里·柯林斯(Harry Collins)和特雷弗·平奇(Trevor Pinch)对案件的陈述,他们声称没有提供充分的理由放弃关于记忆转移的研究。我认为,关于记忆转移的怀疑论者采用了我所说的失败者策略,即研究人员利用证据的不可行性来表征现象。 (C)2018 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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