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The epistemology of hedged laws

机译:对冲法律的认识论

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摘要

Standard objections to the notion of a hedged, or ceteris paribus, law of nature usually boil down to the claim that such laws would be either (1) irredeemably vague, (2) untestable, (3) vacuous, (4) false, or a combination thereof. Using epidemiological studies in nutrition science as an example, I show that this is not true of the hedged law-like generalizations derived from data models used to interpret large and varied sets of empirical observations. Although it may be 'in principle impossible' to construct models that explicitly identify all potential causal interferers with the relevant generalization, the view that our failure to do so is fatal to the very notion of a cp-law is plausible only if one illicitly infers metaphysical impossibility from epistemic impossibility. I close with the suggestion that a model-theoretic approach to cp-laws poses a problem for recent attempts to formulate a Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory of cp-laws.
机译:对被套期保全的自然法则概念的标准异议通常归结为以下主张:(1)不可挽回的模糊性;(2)不可测的(3)虚无;(4)虚假的;或它们的组合。以营养科学中的流行病学研究为例,我证明了这种对立的类似法律的概括并非正确,这种概括源自用于解释大量不同的实证观察结果的数据模型。尽管构造模型以相关泛化来明确识别所有潜在的因果干扰者可能在“原则上是不可能的”,但是我们的失败观点对CP法则的观念是致命的,只有当一个人非法推论时,这种观点才是合理的。形而上学的不可能来自认识论的不可能。我的建议是,CP律的模型理论方法对最近制定CP律的Mill-Ramsey-Lewis理论的尝试提出了问题。

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