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A causal theory of chance?

机译：因果的偶然性理论？

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As must be obvious, I cannot agree with Johns's account of physical probability: I find the premises unacceptable. I suspect that, for the same reason, few others will find the view appealing. I have tried above to give several arguments that lead to what I consider to be deep problems for his view, but the book has other unappealing features. Occasionally a deeper engagement with the relevant literature would have been desirable, despite the fact that Johns's primary concern is to propose a positive view. For example, the omission of Earman (1986) from the discussion of determination (para para3.2-3.3) is quite striking, and leads to a number of confusions about determinism and prediction. This flaw is compounded by the extraordinarily broad scope of Johns's ambition, as often the argument proceeds at a very rapid pace and makes assumptions that have been quite controversial in the literature. The discussions of model-theoretic accounts of entailment (p. 20), of the metaphysics of modality (para3.3.6) and of the problems of direct and inverse inference (para 4.6) are particularly blatant examples, along with several issues I discussed in more detail above. When combined with occasional loose usage of important terms (for example, 'maximal' used in two different senses on p. 22, and the persistent confusion of states of affairs with descriptions of states of affairs throughout Chapters 3 and 4), the persuasiveness of the arguments is substantially impaired. The book is novel, clearly written and technically able, and Johns proposes some very interesting ideas, but as a result of the foregoing problems I cannot recommend the book. The arguments proposed, while interesting, all too often depend on claims that careful readers will find it difficult to accept.
机译：显而易见的是，我不同意约翰对物理概率的描述：我认为前提不可接受。我怀疑出于同样的原因，很少有人会觉得这种观点很有吸引力。上面我曾尝试给出一些论据，这些观点导致我认为对于他的观点来说是深层次的问题，但是本书具有其他令人不悦的特征。尽管约翰斯最主要的关注是提出积极的看法，但有时更希望与相关文献进行更深入的接触。例如，关于确定（第3.2-3.3段）的讨论中，Earman（1986）的遗漏是非常惊人的，并且导致了许多关于确定性和预测的混乱。约翰斯雄心勃勃的范围之广使这一缺陷变得更加复杂，因为辩论常常以非常快的速度进行，并做出了在文献中颇具争议的假设。关于蕴含的模型理论解释（第20页），情态形而上学（第3.3.6段）以及直接和反推论问题（第4.6段）的讨论，尤其是公然的例子，以及我在上文中讨论的几个问题。上面有更多细节。当与重要术语的偶尔使用（例如，第22页以两种不同的含义使用的“最大”以及在第3章和第4章中对事务状态与事务状态描述的持续混淆）结合使用时，争论被大大削弱了。这本书是新颖的，写得清楚并且具有技术能力，Johns提出了一些非常有趣的想法，但是由于上述问题，我不推荐这本书。提出的论点虽然很有趣，但通常都取决于声称细心的读者会发现难以接受的说法。

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