At the start of 2006, when debate over Iraq centres on the prospects for civil war and the modalities for ending the three-year US-led military occupation, consideration of Saddam Hussein's history with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has a surreal quality. Arguably not since the Spanish-American war of 1898 has a military endeavour so rapidly divorced itself from its original strategic grounds and aims. As a result, a recapitulation of the decade preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq - when the international community fitfully but successfully sought to disarm Saddam of WMD - can appear as relevant as a US general in 1900 shouting 'Remember the Maine!' to rally his troops during the Philippine counterinsurgency. Indeed, the most awkward moment in President George W. Bush's recent televised appeal for patience in the war occurred when he acknowledged that all that remained of the original basis for the conflict was 'some capacity to restart programs to produce weapons of mass destruction', before arguing for a renewed commitment to a war that has cost the lives of over 2,000 US troops and at least 30,000 Iraqis.
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