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Two kinds of a priori infallibility

机译:两种先验的绝对性

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On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (1986, 1988, 1996) and Lewis (1996) have recently affirmed the a priori infallibility of some category (ii) propositions. In this paper, I take aim at rationalist infallibilism by calling into question the a priori infallibility of both analytic and synthetic propositions. The upshot will be twofold: first, rationalist infallibilism unsurprisingly emerges as a defective epistemological doctrine, and second, more importantly, the case for the a priori infallibility of one or both categories of propositions turns out to lack cogency.
机译:关于理性主义者的无罪论证,(i)分析和(ii)综合先验命题两者都可以无误地证明是正当的(或绝对有根据的),即在某种程度上证明其真实性并排除其虚假性是合理的。尽管理性主义的无误论的发展无可争议,但坚持两种无误的先验论证中的至少一种并没有从主流认识论中消失。其中,普特南(1978)仍然宣称某些类别(i)命题具有先验绝对性,而布尔奇(Burge(1986,1988,1996)和刘易斯(1996)最近确认了某些类别(ii)命题具有先验绝对性。在本文中,我通过质疑分析命题和综合命题的先验可靠性来瞄准理性主义的谬论。结果将是双重的:首先,理性主义的谬误主义无疑是一种有缺陷的认识论学说,其次,更重要的是,一种或两种命题的先验无误的事实证明缺乏缺乏说服力。

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