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Proper function and defeating experiences

机译：适当的功能和失败的经历

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Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of warrant. The epistemic features I’m concerned about are experiences that should generate a believed defeater but don’t. I’ll argue that proper functionalism as it stands cannot account for the epistemic effects of these defeating experiences—or, at least, that it can only do so by embracing a deeply implausible view of our cognitive faculties. I’ll conclude by arguing that the only plausible option Bergmann has for modifying his theory undercuts the consideration that motivates proper functionalism in the first place.
机译：乔纳森·克万维格（Jonathan Kvanvig）辩称，他所说的认识论辩护的“过时的”理论无法解释某些与证据有关的认识论特征。我将大致按照这些思路进行论证，但我将专门关注证明或保证的适当功能理论。特别是，我将重点介绍迈克尔·伯格曼（Michael Bergmann）最近的正当理由说明，尽管该论点也适用于阿尔文·普林达加（Alvin Plantinga）的权证适当说明。我所关注的认知特征是应该引起公认的失败者但没有的经验。我将辩解说，正确的功能主义不能解释这些失败经历的认知影响，或者至少，它只能通过对我们的认知能力抱有极为不切实际的看法来做到这一点。最后，我争论说，伯格曼修改其理论的唯一可行选择削弱了首先激发适当功能主义的考虑。

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