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首页> 外文期刊>Telecommunications Policy >Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays
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Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays

机译：移动终止费用：呼叫方付款与接收方付款

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In many countries there is widespread concern at the level of mobile termination charges. This is attributable to the bottleneck monopoly created by the Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle. It has led to increasingly severe price controls on termination charges. Regulatory experience in the three foremost such countries (UK, Australia and New Zealand) suggests that price controls are of limited effectiveness in aligning termination charges with costs, that net welfare gains from controls are small and that costs of setting controls are high. The Receiving Party Pays (RPP) principle, which applies in North America and several Asian countries, avoids the bottleneck monopoly problem. After allowing for various economic and technical average revenue (price) per call is significantly lower with RPP, average minutes of usage per subscriber are significantly higher and the mobile penetration rate is not significantly different. Handset subsidies seem to be lower in the US (with RPP) than in the UK (with CPP). Surprisingly, CPP regulators have either ignored RPP or rejected it for various alleged disadvantages. These do not withstand investigation. However, in CPP countries there is still concern about the idea of paying to receive calls. There is a way to get the benefits associated with RPP without this disadvantage. RPP is based on a 'bill and keep' regime. Some mobile operators in RPP countries are now offering customers the option of calling plans with free incoming calls. Changing to a 'bill and keep' regime would avoid the bottleneck monopoly and associated distortions of conventional CPP regimes, yet enable operators and customers themselves to choose how to pay for calls—in effect, to choose between CPP and RPP.
机译：在许多国家，人们对移动终端收费水平普遍感到担忧。这归因于呼叫方付费（CPP）原则造成的瓶颈垄断。这导致对终止费用的价格控制越来越严格。在这三个最重要的国家（英国，澳大利亚和新西兰）的监管经验表明，价格控制在将终止费用与成本保持一致方面的作用有限，控制产生的净福利收益很小，而实施控制的成本很高。适用于北美和一些亚洲国家的接收方付款（RPP）原则避免了瓶颈垄断问题。考虑到RPP，每个呼叫的各种经济和技术平均收入（价格）明显降低后，每个用户的平均使用分钟数显着提高，并且移动普及率没有显着差异。在美国（使用RPP）的手机补贴似乎低于英国（使用CPP）的手机补贴。出乎意料的是，CPP监管机构要么忽视了RPP，要么因各种所谓的不利条件而拒绝了RPP。这些经不起调查。但是，在CPP国家中，仍然需要付费以接听电话。有一种方法可以获得与RPP相关的好处而又没有这个缺点。 RPP基于“保单保管”制度。 RPP国家中的一些移动运营商现在向客户提供带有免费来电的呼叫计划选项。更改为“保持计费”制度将避免瓶颈垄断和传统CPP体制带来的扭曲，但使运营商和客户自己可以选择如何付费的电话，实际上是在CPP和RPP之间进行选择。

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