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首页> 外文期刊>Territory, politics, governance >The fiscal politics of resource revenue: federalism, oil ownership and territorial conflict in Brazil and Canada
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The fiscal politics of resource revenue: federalism, oil ownership and territorial conflict in Brazil and Canada

机译：资源收入财政政治：巴西和加拿大的联邦制，石油所有权和领土冲突

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This paper explores the fiscal politics of oil revenue in Brazil and Canada, two oil-rich federal countries that have different constitutional arrangements for revenue allocation and where constituent unit governments have different powers in the energy sector. More specifically, it offers a comparative analysis of the intergovernmental relations around oil revenue distribution in both countries over the last 30 years. The argument is that constitutional provisions on natural resources in federations (federal ownership or constituent unit ownership) produce distinct federal dynamics as it pertains to intergovernmental relations. Federal government ownership of natural resources produces conflicts between constituent units as they vie for their share of the proceeds. In contrast, provincial ownership eliminates the direct competition between constituent units for natural resource revenues. Nevertheless, intergovernmental tensions over natural resources can still appear as constituent units pressure the federal government to adopt horizontal fiscal equalization formulas friendly to their oil-producing, or non-oil-producing economies.
机译：本文探讨了巴西和加拿大的石油收入财政政治，这两个石油丰富的联邦国家有不同的宪法安排，营造税收分配以及组成部门各国政府在能源部门有不同的权力。更具体地说，它提供了对过去30年来两国石油收入分布的政府间关系的比较分析。这一论点是，关于联合会（联邦所有权或组成单位所有权）的关于自然资源的宪法规定会产生不同的联邦动力学，因为它涉及政府间关系。联邦政府自然资源的所有权在组成单位之间产生冲突，因为他们争夺其收益份额。相比之下，省级所有权消除了自然资源收入的组成单位之间的直接竞争。尽管如此，对自然资源的政府间紧张局势仍然可以作为组成单位压力，联邦政府通过水平财政均等化公式友好，以友好地友好地友好生产石油生产或非石油生产经济体。

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