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首页> 外文期刊>The China quarterly >Shifting Fiscal Control to Limit Cadre Power in China's Townships and Villages
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Shifting Fiscal Control to Limit Cadre Power in China's Townships and Villages

机译：转变财政控制，限制中国乡镇干部的权力

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摘要

In contrast to its decentralized political economy model of the 1980s, China took a surprising turn towards recentralization in the mid-1990s. Its fiscal centralization, starting with the 1994 tax reforms, is well known, but political recentralization also has been under way to control cadres directly at township and village levels. Little-noticed measures designed to tighten administrative and fiscal regulation began to be implemented during approximately the same period in the mid-1990s. Over time these measures have succeeded in hollowing out the power of village and township cadres. The increasing reach of the central state is the direct result of explicit state policies that have taken power over economic resources that were once under the control of village and township cadres. This article examines the broad shift towards recentralization by examining the fiscal and political consequences of these policies at the village and township levels. Evidence for this shift comes from new survey data on village-level investments, administrative regulation and fiscal oversight, as well as township-level fiscal revenues, expenditures, transfers (between counties and townships) and public-goods investments.
机译：与1980年代的去中心化政治经济学模型相反，中国在1990年代中期突然转向了中央集权化。从1994年税制改革开始，其财政集中化已广为人知，但也正在进行政治上的集中化，以直接在乡镇一级控制干部。在1990年代中期大约同一时期开始实施旨在加强行政和财政监管的鲜为人知的措施。随着时间的流逝，这些措施成功地挖掘了乡镇干部的权力。中央国家越来越大的影响力是直接的国家政策的直接结果，这些政策已经夺取了曾经由乡镇干部控制的经济资源。本文通过考察这些政策在乡村和乡镇一级的财政和政治后果，考察了向中央集权化的广泛转变。这种转变的证据来自有关村级投资，行政法规和财政监督以及乡级财政收入，支出，（县与乡之间的转移）和公共物品投资的新调查数据。

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