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首页> 外文期刊>The Journal of Ethics >How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?

机译：道德分歧如何成为现实主义的问题？

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Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight, I conclude, against moral realism.
机译：人们广泛认为道德分歧会对亚伦理现实主义和客观性构成威胁。在本文中，我试图了解道德上的分歧是如何构成元伦理现实主义问题的。为此，我将通过不同意见中的几个不同的（尽管通常是相关的）争论，仔细区分它们，并认真评估它们的优点。我的结论颇为怀疑：我所讨论的某些论点相当明显地失败了。其他人则对现实主义提出了挑战，但没有一个我们有理由相信现实主义无法成功解决。其他人则向道德现实主义者提出了这个问题，而另一些人则对现实主义提出了严重的反对意见，但是，如果认真地指出这一点，就可以认为它们与道德上的分歧根本无关。我得出结论，基于道德分歧的争论本身几乎没有权衡道德现实主义。

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