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The War Prerogative And Constitutional Change

机译：战争特权和宪法变更

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Legal form conditions the institutional relations between the courts, the executive and Parliament. The fear of people rushing off to the High Court to get a quashing order against deployment decisions has led many to reject the statutory route, including the House of Lords Committee and the Government under the White Paper proposals. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution and the Government wanted a change of substance without a change of legal form. The question to be considered is whether a convention can really create a significant change in scrutiny and accountability of the exercise of the war powers. It should be added, that an Act of Parliament does not automatically curtail the executive's discretion. That depends on what is in the Act. But an Act of Parliament regulating war powers would draw the courts in, at the very least, minimally. By contrast, conventions do not satisfy some people because they have no legal form at all and depend upon the internalised weight of obligation; in other words how the executive interprets or feels obliged to apply the convention. It is important to remember that under the convention option, the legal form remains the royal prerogative. No serious analysis of war powers can ignore the impact upon military effectiveness of the manner of authorising military action. How power is exercised and upon what conditions of approval and oversight is bound to influence military outcomes. The relation between military and government is a key marker of what type of political system there is. But in the United Kingdom the issue at stake is not about controlling the military but the respective roles of the different branches of government; ultimately the issue we are dealing with is the constitutional issue of the respective competencies of the courts, parliament and the executive. In the House of Lord's debate, Lord Holme stated that the key issue was not an arcane constitutional matter but, It is at root, a question of democratic legitimacy. The question is: in a modern democracy, not a 15th century monarchy, on whose authority should the young men and women of our armed services be sen t overseas to fight for their country? In fact there are many arcane matters of the constitution to be grasped. The central question is, as Lord Holme indicated, 'Who should decide?' and that question of democratic legitimacy is par excellence a constitutional matter. But the answer to that is highly complex. A convention is not a guarantee that much will change. If you look at the options favoured by the Government, in particular the large discretionary element left in the hands of the Prime Minister, the particulars of war powers could easily end up remarkably similar to before. Oversight and regulation of the war powers is sub-set of two much larger constitutional issues: that of the legal form by which the executive's powers are encoded and the institutional roles of the executive, Parliament and judiciary. It could be argued that incrementalism is a fraud allowing the system to continue 'business as usual'. An effective solution requires radical change, re-working the legal structure of the state and necessitating a written constitution.
机译：法律形式限制了法院，行政机关和议会之间的机构关系。人们担心人们会冲向高等法院以要求取消部署决定，因此许多人拒绝了这条法定路线，包括上议院委员会和白皮书提议的政府。上议院宪法特别委员会和政府希望在不改变法律形式的情况下改变实质内容。需要考虑的问题是，公约是否真的可以在行使战争权的审查和问责制方面真正产生重大变化。应该补充的是，《议会法》不会自动减少行政机关的酌处权。这取决于该法案中的内容。但是，一部规制战争权力的国会法案至少会在最小程度上吸引法庭。相比之下，公约并不使某些人满意，因为它们根本没有法律形式，取决于义务的内在分量。换句话说，行政人员如何解释或觉得有义务适用公约。重要的是要记住，根据公约的选择，法律形式仍然是王室特权。认真分析战争权力不能忽略授权军事行动的方式对军事效力的影响。如何行使权力以及在什么条件下才能通过批准和监督才能影响军事结果。军事与政府之间的关系是现有政治制度类型的关键标志。但是在英国，紧要关头不是控制军队，而是政府不同部门的各自作用。最终，我们要处理的问题是法院，议会和行政部门各自权限的宪法问题。在上议院的辩论中，霍姆勋爵指出，关键问题不是奥秘的宪法问题，而是根本上的民主合法性问题。问题是：在现代民主制中，而不是15世纪的君主制中，我们的武装部队中的青年男女应在谁的职权上为自己的国家而战？实际上，宪法中有许多不可思议的问题要掌握。正如霍尔姆勋爵所指出的，核心问题是“谁来决定？”而民主合法性的问题是卓越的宪法问题。但是答案很复杂。约定并不能保证会有很多改变。如果您看一下政府青睐的选择，尤其是总理掌握的大量自由裁量权，那么战争权力的细节很可能最终会变得与以前非常相似。战争权的监督和管理是两个更大的宪法问题的子集：行政权力的法律形式和行政，议会和司法机构的机构角色。可以说增量主义是一种欺诈，它使系统继续“照常营业”。一个有效的解决方案需要进行根本性的改变，重新构造国家的法律结构，并需要成文的宪法。

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  • 来源
    《The RUSI journal》 |2008年第3期|p.28-35|共8页
  • 作者

    Sebastian Payne;

  • 作者单位

    Constitutional and Administrative Lawat the University of Kent, UK;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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