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Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation

机译：反向多单位荷兰式拍卖中的出价汇总：一项实验性调查

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摘要

In this article we experimentally investigate reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions in which bidders compete to sell their single unit to a buyer who wants to purchase several objects. Our study yields three insights: (i) bids are substantially higher than Nash equilibrium bids predicted by standard economic theory; (ii) these higher-than-predicted prices gradually decline in later periods; and (iii) bid pooling (or simultaneous bidding) is frequently observed-the majority of bidders submit their bids immediately after the first bidder has sold his unit. A model that distinguishes between myopic and sophisticated bidding strategies helps to organize these patterns both on the aggregate and on the individual level.
机译：在本文中，我们通过实验研究了反向多单位荷兰式拍卖，其中竞标者竞争将其单个单位出售给想要购买多个物品的买方。我们的研究得出以下三个见解：（i）出价远高于标准经济学理论预测的纳什均衡出价； （ii）这些高于预期的价格在随后的时期逐渐下降； （iii）经常观察到投标合并（或同时投标）-大多数投标人在第一个投标人出售其单位后立即提交投标。区分近视出价策略和复杂出价策略的模型有助于在总体上和在各个级别上组织这些模式。

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