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The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination

机译：提名过程中阿罗夫式社会选择的可能性

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摘要

In this paper, we introduce an Arrovian social choice framework with the process of nomination. We consider a two-stage social choice procedure in which some alternatives are first nominated by aggregating the opinions of nominators, and then the society makes a collective choice from the nominated alternatives by aggregating the preferences of voters. Each nominator's opinion is a positive, negative, or neutral view as to whether each alternative deserves to be eligible for collective decision making. If a voter is a nominator, his preference space is restricted by his opinion as follows: he always prefers positive alternatives to neutral ones and neutral alternatives to negative ones, according to his opinion. When each nominating voter has such a preference space, we first characterize Arrow-consistent preference domains at the second stage of the social choice framework. Second, we find a resolution of Arrow's impossibility theorem when at least one nominating voter exists.
机译：在本文中，我们介绍了具有提名过程的Arrovian社会选择框架。我们考虑一个两阶段的社会选择程序，在该程序中，首先通过汇总提名人的意见来提名某些替代方案，然后社会通过汇总选民的偏好来从提名的替代方案中做出集体选择。对于每种选择是否值得进行集体决策，每个提名人的意见都是正面，负面或中立的观点。如果选民是提名人，则他的偏好空间受到他的意见的限制如下：根据他的意见，他总是偏向于中立的选择而不是中立的选择。当每个提名选民都有这样的偏好空间时，我们将在社会选择框架的第二阶段首先描述箭头一致的偏好域。其次，当至少有一个提名选民存在时，我们找到阿罗不可能定理的解决方案。

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