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INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL CONSENSUS

机译:不平等与政治共识

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摘要

This paper develops a model of political consensus in order to explain the missing link between inequality and political redistribution. Political consensus is an implicit agreement not to vote for extreme policy proposals. We show that such an agreement may play an efficiency-enhancing role. Voters anticipate that voting for extremist parties increases policy uncertainty in the future. A political consensus among voters reduces policy uncertainty because self-interested politicians propose non-discriminatory policies. We study how much inequality can be sustained in a democracy and how the limits to redistribution vary with initial inequality. The bounds of the set of political equilibria may react in a fundamentally different manner to changes in exogenous variables than do the policy variables in the one-dimensional, one-shot game. More initial inequality need not lead to more redistribution from the rich to the poor. The maximum amount of redistribution decreases with inequality if (and only if) agents are sufficiently patient. In this case inequality is politically self-sustaining.
机译:本文建立了一种政治共识模型,以解释不平等与政治再分配之间缺失的联系。政治共识是不投票赞成极端政策建议的隐含协议。我们表明,这样的协议可以起到提高效率的作用。选民们预计,对极端党的投票将增加未来的政策不确定性。选民之间的政治共识减少了政策的不确定性,因为利己的政客提出了非歧视性政策。我们研究了民主制度中可以维持多少不平等,以及重新分配的限制如何随着最初的不平等而变化。与一维,一枪博弈中的政策变量相比,政治平衡集的边界可能以根本不同的方式对外生变量的变化做出反应。最初的不平等现象更多,不必导致从富人到穷人的更多分配。当(且仅当)代理足够耐心时,最大重新分配量会随着不平等而降低。在这种情况下,不平等在政治上是可持续的。

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