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FINITE ALTERNATING-MOVE ARBITRATION SCHEMES AND THE EQUAL AREA SOLUTION

机译：有限交替移动仲裁方案和均等面积解决方案

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We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to "bad" alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which players' current proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first scheme's equilibrium outcome set coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemes' equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solution's outcome of cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
机译：我们从考虑替代性罢工（AS）方案开始，这是一种现实生活中的仲裁方案，在这种方案中，两方通过在给定的一组仲裁员中轮流在每个回合的名字上交替来选择一名仲裁员。我们发现，AS方案对于“不良”替代方案并非不变。然后，我们考虑另一种交替移动方案，即通过交替报价和否决权投票（VAOV）方案，该方案与不良选择无关。我们仅根据当事方相对于备选方案的排名来充分表征上述两种方案的子博弈完美均衡结果集。我们还确定了以上两种方案的一些典型平衡。然后，我们分析了另外两个交替执行方案，其中参与者的当前提议必须兑现或增强其先前的提议。我们表明，第一个方案的均衡结果集与AS方案的均衡结果集重合，第二个方案的均衡结果集与VAOV方案的均衡结果集重合。最后，事实证明，如果替代方案均匀地分布在综合效用可能性集上，并且替代方案的数量趋于无穷大，则所有方案的均衡结果集都收敛于等面积解决方案的合作议价问题的结果。经济文献杂志分类号：C72。

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