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CAN BAYES' RULE BE JUSTIFIED BY COGNITIVE RATIONALITY PRINCIPLES?

机译:认知理性原则可以确定贝叶斯的规则吗?

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摘要

The justification of Bayes' rule by cognitive rationality principles is undertaken by extending the propositional axiom systems usually proposed in two contexts of belief change: revising and updating. Probabilistic belief change axioms are introduced, either by direct transcription of the set-theoretic ones, or in a stronger way but nevertheless in the spirit of the underlying propositional principles. Weak revising axioms are shown to be satisfied by a General Conditioning rule, extending Bayes' rule but also compatible with others, and weak updating axioms by a General Imaging rule, extending Lewis' rule. Strong axioms (equivalent to the Miller-Popper axiom system) are necessary to justify Bayes' rule in a revising context, and justify in fact an extended Bayes' rule which applies, even if the message has zero probability.
机译:通过扩展通常在信念变化的两种情况下提出的命题公理系统来进行认知合理性原则对贝叶斯规则的辩护:修订和更新。概率信念改变公理既可以通过集理论理论的直接转录来引入,也可以通过更强的方式引入,但是仍然遵循基本命题原则的精神。弱修正公理显示为满足一般条件规则,既扩展了贝叶斯规则,又与其他规则兼容;而弱更新公理则满足了通用成像规则,从而扩展了刘易斯规则。强公理(等效于Miller-Popper公理系统)对于在不断变化的情况下证明贝叶斯规则是必要的,并且即使消息具有零概率,实际上也要证明适用的扩展贝叶斯规则是合理的。

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