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Additive multi-effort contests

机译：添加多项筹备比赛

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This article analyzes rent seeking with multiple additive efforts for each of two players. Impact on rent seeking occurs even when a player exerts only one effort. This contrasts with models of multiplicative efforts with impact on rent seeking only when a player exerts all its available efforts. An analytical solution is developed when the contest intensities are below one, and equal to one for one effort. Then, additional efforts causing interior solutions give players higher expected utilities and lower rent dissipation, which contrasts with earlier findings for multiplicative efforts. Players cut back on the effort with contest intensity equal to one, and exert alternative efforts instead. Accounting for solutions which have to be determined numerically, a Nash equilibrium selection method is provided. For illustration, an example with maximum two efforts for each player is provided. Equilibria are shown where both players choose both efforts, or one player withdraws from its most costly effort. Both players may collectively prefer to exclude one of their efforts, though in equilibrium, they may prefer both efforts. When all contest intensities are equal to one or larger than one, only the one most cost-effective effort is exerted, due to the logic of linear or convex production. Rent dissipation increases in the contest intensity, and is maximum when the players are equally advantaged determined by unit effort cost divided by impact.
机译：本文分析了两名球员每个人的多种添加性努力的租金。即使一名球员施加一次努力，也会发生对租金的影响。这与乘法努力的模型相比，只有当球员施加所有可用努力时，才会对租金的影响。当比赛强度低于一个，等于一个努力时，开发了一个分析解决方案。然后，造成内部解决方案的额外努力使球员提供更高的预期公用事业和较低的租金耗散，这与乘法努力的早期调查结果形成鲜明对比。玩家削减了比赛强度等于一个的努力，并施加替代努力。提供了必须在数值上确定的解决方案的核对，提供了一种纳什平衡选择方法。有关插图，提供了最多两项播放器的两个努力的示例。均衡显示，两个玩家选择两种努力，或者一名球员从最昂贵的努力中撤销。两名球员可能集体愿意排除他们的一个努力，虽然在均衡中，但它们可能更喜欢两种努力。当所有比赛强度等于一个或大于一个时，由于线性或凸的逻辑，只有最具成本效益的努力。比赛强度租金耗散增加，最大当球员通过单位努力成本除以影响而等于何时确定。

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