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Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities

机译：具有外部性的拍卖中的战略合谋

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摘要

We study a first-price auction preceded by a negotiation stage with complete information, during which bidders may form a bidding ring. We prove that in the absence of externalities, the grand cartel forms in equilibrium, allowing ring members to gain the auctioned object for a minimal price. However, identity-dependent externalities may lead to the formation of small rings, as often observed in practice. Potential ring members may condition their participation on high transfer payments as a compensation for their expected (negative) externalities if the ring forms. The cartel may therefore profitably exclude these bidders, although risking tougher competition in the auction. We also analyze ring (in)efficiency in the presence of externalities, showing that a ring may prefer sending an inefficient member to the auction, if the efficient member exerts threatening externalities on bidders outside the ring, which in turn leads to a higher winning price.
机译：我们研究了一个带有完整信息的协商阶段之前的首次拍卖，在此期间，投标人可能会形成一个投标环。我们证明，在没有外部性的情况下，大卡特尔形成均衡状态，允许环成员以最低价格获得拍卖对象。但是，身份依赖的外部性可能导致小环的形成，这在实践中经常观察到。潜在的环成员可能会限制参加高转移支付，以补偿其形成的预期（负）外部性。因此，卡特尔可能会有利地排除这些竞标者，尽管冒着在拍卖中进行更激烈竞争的风险。我们还分析了在存在外部性的情况下环的效率低下，表明如果有效成员对环外的投标人施加威胁性外部性，环可能更喜欢将低效率的成员发送给拍卖，从而导致更高的中标价格。

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