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The Effect of Risk Aversion on Manufacturer Advertising in a Two-Stage Supply Chain

机译：风险规避对两阶段供应链中制造商广告的影响

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摘要

We consider a supply chain system with a risk-neutral manufacturer as the leader and a risk-averse retailer as the follower with uncertain demand. At the beginning of the game, the manufacturer makes efforts on advertising and then the retailer decides its order quantity before demand realization. The retailer's risk aversion is modeled by the Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach with the downside risk constraint. The analysis of equilibrium strategies indicates some characteristics of the game are different from those under risk-neutral assumptions. We find that the manufacturer can effec tively prevent the risk-averse retailer from downsizing the order quantity through advertising. In order to explain the difference, we investigate the impacts of risk aversion on the manufacturer's advertising decision and the retailer's ordering decision. We find that the retailer with moderate degree of risk aversion orders a larger volume and receives greater advertising support from the manufacturer. Moreover, the feasible combinations of target profit and downside risk for moderate risk aversion are discussed to derive the relationship of the two parameters. In addition, we make a simple analysis of the situation with two independent retailers who have heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion.
机译：我们考虑一个供应链系统，其中需求不确定的制造商为风险中立的制造商为领导者，规避风险的零售商为跟随者。在游戏开始时，制造商会努力进行广告宣传，然后零售商在需求实现之前确定其订购数量。零售商的风险规避是通过风险值（VaR）方法建模的，并具有下行风险约束。均衡策略的分析表明，博弈的某些特征不同于风险中性假设下的特征。我们发现制造商可以有效地防止规避风险的零售商通过广告减少订单数量。为了解释差异，我们调查了风险规避对制造商的广告决策和零售商的订购决策的影响。我们发现，风险规避程度适中的零售商订购的商品数量较大，并且从制造商那里获得了更多的广告支持。此外，还讨论了目标利润和下行风险之间对中度风险规避的可行组合，以得出两个参数之间的关系。此外，我们对两家具有不同程度规避风险的独立零售商的情况进行了简单分析。

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  • 来源
    《Transportation journal》 |2012年第1期|p.59-79|共21页
  • 作者

    Donghan Liang; Gang Li; Linyan Sun; Xinyu Sun; Jie Gao;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Logistic and Maritimes Studies The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Horn, Hong Kong;

    Department of Logistic and Maritimes Studies The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Horn, Hong Kong The Management School of Xi'an Jiaotong University The State Key Lab for Manufacturing Systems Engineering The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering, Xi'an, 710049, China;

    Department of Logistic and Maritimes Studies The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Horn, Hong Kong The Management School of Xi'an Jiaotong University The State Key Lab for Manufacturing Systems Engineering The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering, Xi'an, 710049, China;

    Department of Logistic and Maritimes Studies The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Horn, Hong Kong;

    The Management School of Xi'an Jiaotong University The State Key Lab for Manufacturing Systems Engineering The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering, Xi'an, 710049, China;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    risk aversion; value-at-risk (VaR); stackelberg game; newsvendor;

    机译：风险规避;风险价值（VaR）;Stackelberg游戏;新闻供应商;

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