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Modeling and managing heterogeneous ride-sourcing platforms with government subsidies on electric vehicles

机译：用电动汽车补贴建模与管理异质乘坐平台

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This paper formulates duopoly competition between two non-cooperative heterogeneous ride-sourcing platforms considering the adoption of electric vehicles (EV) and government subsidies on EVs. One ride-sourcing platform adopts an EV asset-heavy strategy by undertaking EV depreciation costs, while the other ride-sourcing platform adopts an asset-light strategy by hiring drivers who own vehicles. The first-order conditions of each platform's pricingunder competitive equilibrium are derived based on a game-theoretical model that involves the stakeholders (i.e., riders, drivers, and ride-sourcing platforms). Based on the modeling framework of duopoly competition between two heterogeneous ride-sourcing platforms, this paper proposes an optimization model with social welfare maximization for the determination of government subsidy strategies. We conduct numerical illustrations to demonstrate how governmental subsidies on EV purchase and charging stations impact the endogenous variables in equilibrium (e.g., price for riders, wage for drivers, and market share for each platform) under different formulations of riders' waiting time cost function, which are increasing returns to scale. Also, a special model with a fixed commission ratio is discussed. The results provide suggestions for decision-makers on how to allocate subsidy within the budget constraint. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：本文在考虑采用电动汽车（EV）和EVS的政府补贴的情况下，两个非合作异构乘坐平台之间的双级竞争。一个乘车采购平台通过开展EV折旧成本采用EV资产重型战略，而另一个乘坐平台通过雇用车辆的驾驶员采用资产光策略。基于涉及利益相关者的游戏理论模型（即车手，驱动程序和乘坐采购平台）导出每个平台定价竞争均衡的一阶条件。基于两个异构乘坐平台之间二浦竞争的建模框架，本文提出了一种与社会福利最大化的优化模型，以确定政府补贴策略。我们进行数字插图，以展示EV购买和充电站的政府补贴如何影响骑行者等待时间成本函数的不同配方下均衡的均衡（例如，驾驶员，工资和市场份额的价格，工资和市场份额）的内源性变量，这是越来越多的返回量表。此外，讨论了具有固定佣金比率的特殊模型。结果为决策者提供了如何在预算限制范围内分配补贴的建议。 （c）2020 elestvier有限公司保留所有权利。

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