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Reverse and closed loop supply chain coordination by government role

机译：政府角色下的逆向和闭环供应链协调

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Due to the increasing number of end-of-life (EOL) products and their related environmental concerns, much attention has been paid to reverse logistics. In this paper, we consider a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) with one manufacturer and one retailer who try to improve sustainable consumption by increasing customers' willingness to return used products through offering a discount or a direct fee in exchange for bringing back EOL products. Afterward, the model is extended to consider a closed loop supply chain (CLSC). Quantity discounts and increasing fee contracts are proposed to coordinate supply chains. Then, government role in improving coordinated supply chains through donating different incentives (tax exemption and subsidy) to supply chain members are analyzed. Results show that total channel profit in the coordinated case is improved. Also, in the proposed models, each member has enough motives to participate in the plan. In addition, results demonstrate that government-sponsored incentives to the manufacturer are preferred to the retailer. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：由于报废（EOL）产品数量的增加及其相关的环境问题，人们对逆向物流给予了极大关注。在本文中，我们考虑了两级逆向供应链（RSC），其中一家制造商和一家零售商试图通过提供折扣或直接费用来增加客户的意愿，以通过提供折扣或直接费用来换取返还，从而提高客户的可持续消费能力。停产的产品。之后，模型被扩展以考虑闭环供应链（CLSC）。提议数量折扣和增加费用合同来协调供应链。然后，分析了政府通过向供应链成员捐赠不同的激励措施（免税和补贴）来改善协调的供应链的作用。结果表明，在协调的情况下，渠道总利润有所提高。同样，在提出的模型中，每个成员都有足够的动机参与计划。此外，结果表明，政府对制造商的激励措施比零售商更受青睐。 （C）2017 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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