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首页> 外文期刊>Transportation Research Part B: Methodological >Dynamic equilibrium at a congestible facility under market power
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Dynamic equilibrium at a congestible facility under market power

机译：市场力量下的易耗设施动态平衡

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This paper studies equilibrium and optimum at a congested facility when firms have market power; e.g., when a few airlines jointly use a congested airport. Unlike most of the previous literature, we characterize the equilibrium in terms of timing of arrivals in a continuous-time congestion model when firms simultaneously schedule services. Using the Henderson-Chu dynamic model of flow congestion in a multiple-firm setting, we find that a stable and unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies always exists. Importantly, it also exists in cases where it fails to exist under bottleneck congestion (notably when the value of schedule late exceeds the value of travel delays). We find that symmetric firms schedule arrivals inefficiently, and strongly concentrated around the desired arrival time so that the peak is shorter and delays are higher than socially optimal. We show that when firms are asymmetric in terms of output, all firms schedule vehicles in the peak center, around the desired arrival time, with arrival windows increasing with firm size such that a smaller firm's window is always fully contained in a larger firm's window and only the largest firm operates in the early and late shoulders. Furthermore, for any pair of asymmetric firms, the larger firm has a higher instantaneous arrival rate at any moment where both firms schedule arrivals. Our results also show that even though self-internalization can be substantial, there is scope for decentralizing the first-best outcome through time-varying tolls. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：当企业具有市场支配力时，本文研究了拥挤设施中的均衡和最优。例如，当几家航空公司共同使用拥挤的机场时。与大多数以前的文献不同，当企业同时调度服务时，我们以连续时间拥塞模型中的到达时间为特征来描述均衡。使用多公司环境中流量拥挤的Henderson-Chu动态模型，我们发现在纯策略中始终存在稳定且唯一的Nash平衡。重要的是，它在瓶颈拥塞下不存在的情况下也存在（特别是当计划延迟的值超过旅行延迟的值时）。我们发现，对称的公司调度到达的效率低下，并且强烈地集中在所需的到达时间附近，因此高峰期更短，延迟高于社会上的最优水平。我们表明，当企业的产出不对称时，所有企业都将车辆调度在高峰中心附近的所需到达时间，到达窗口随企业规模的增加而增加，使得较小的企业窗口始终完全包含在较大的企业窗口中，并且只有最大的公司在早期和晚期经营。此外，对于任何一对不对称的公司，在两个公司都计划到达的任何时刻，较大的公司都有较高的瞬时到达率。我们的结果还表明，尽管自我内在化可能很重要，但仍有可能通过时变通行费来分散最佳结果。 （C）2017 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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