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Airport complementarity: Private vs. government ownership and welfare gravitation

机译：机场的互补性：私人与政府所有权和福利引力

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摘要

We study the effects of airport ownership (private vs. government) on welfare in the pres ence of airport complementarity, where each airport is located in a different country. Con sidering Cournot competition in the airline market, the unique Nash equilibrium is such that the two countries privatize their airports, even though both countries are better off, from a welfare perspective, with public (government-owned) airports. Considering a differ entiated Bertrand competition in the airline market, the same result prevails if the cross price elasticities are sufficiently high, otherwise the symmetric government-ownership of airports may also be a Nash equilibrium.
机译：我们在机场互补的情况下研究了机场所有权（私人与政府）对福利的影响，每个机场位于不同的国家。考虑到古诺（Cournot）在航空市场上的竞争，独特的纳什均衡使得两国将其机场私有化，即使从福利的角度来看，两国在公共（政府所有）机场方面的状况都更好。考虑到航空公司市场上不同的贝特朗竞争，如果交叉价格弹性足够高，则相同的结果将占上风，否则，对称的机场政府所有权也可能是纳什均衡。

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