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首页> 外文期刊>Transportation Research Part B: Methodological >Information provision by regulated public transport companies
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Information provision by regulated public transport companies

机译：受管制的公共交通公司提供的信息

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We study the interaction between pricing, frequency of service and information provision by public transport firms offering scheduled services, and we do so under various regulatory regimes. The model assumes that users can come to the bus stop or rail station at random or they can plan their trips; the fraction of users who plan their trips is endogenous and depends on the frequency of service and on the quality of information provided. Four institutional regimes are considered, reflecting various degrees of government regulation. A numerical example illustrates the theoretical results. Findings include the following. First, fare regulation induces the firm to provide less frequency and less information than is socially optimal. Second, if information and frequency did not affect the number of planning users a higher fare always induces the firm to raise both frequency and the quality of information. With endogenous planning, however, this need not be the case, as the effect of higher fares strongly depends on how frequency and information quality affect the number of planners. Third, a profit-maximizing firm offers more information than a fare-regulated firm. Fourth, if the agency regulates both the fare and the quality of information then more stringent information requirements induce the firm to reduce frequency; this strongly limits the welfare improvement of information regulation. Finally, of all institutional structures considered, socially optimal fares, frequency and quality of information stimulate passengers least to plan their trips, because the high frequency offered reduces the benefits of trip planning.
机译：我们研究定价，服务频率和提供定期服务的公共运输公司提供信息之间的相互作用，并且我们在各种监管制度下进行这种相互作用。该模型假设用户可以随机到达公交车站或火车站，或者可以计划行程。计划行程的用户比例是内生的，取决于服务的频率和所提供信息的质量。考虑了四种体制制度，反映了不同程度的政府监管。数值例子说明了理论结果。调查结果包括以下内容。首先，票价管制促使公司提供的频率和信息少于社会最优的。其次，如果信息和频率不影响计划用户的数量，那么较高的票价总是会诱使公司提高频率和信息质量。但是，对于内源性计划而言，情况并非必须如此，因为较高票价的影响很大程度上取决于频率和信息质量如何影响计划者的数量。第三，利润最大化的公司比票价监管的公司提供更多的信息。第四，如果代理商同时控制票价和信息质量，那么更严格的信息要求将导致公司降低频率。这极大地限制了信息监管的福利改善。最后，在所有考虑的制度结构中，社会最优票价，信息的频率和质量对乘客的行程安排的刺激最小，因为提供的高频率降低了行程计划的好处。

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