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The social efficiency of long-term capacity reserve mechanisms

机译：长期能力储备机制的社会效率

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摘要

In Public Economics, the simple supply mechanism for a collective good is the centralised provision by government, and paid by all beneficiaries through a small and targeted tax. In the case of capacity adequacy in power supply, which could be considered as a collective good, two solutions of supply by government can be envisaged: a long-term capacity reserve contracting by the system operator (SO), and a direct installation of peaking units by the SO. However, the centralised and direct mechanisms are criticised, because of its potential to distort incentives to invest in peaking units and hence the natural functioning of energy markets. This paper analyses the different characters of a simple capacity mechanism and the safeguards used to limit its potential distortion effects. We discuss its deterrent effects on investment in peaking units. We also demonstrate its advantage in the context of hydro or mixed electricity systems exposed to the risk of exceptionally dry years.
机译：在公共经济学中，集体物品的简单供给机制是政府的集中供给，并由所有受益者通过少量而有针对性的税收来支付。在电力供应充足的情况下，可以考虑将其视为集体物品，可以设想政府提供两种解决方案：系统运营商（SO）的长期容量储备合同，以及直接安装调峰系统以SO为单位。但是，集中化和直接机制受到批评，因为它有可能扭曲对高峰单位进行投资的动机，从而扭曲能源市场的自然运转。本文分析了简单容量机制的不同特征以及用于限制其潜在失真效应的保护措施。我们讨论了其对高峰单位投资的威慑作用。我们还展示了在面临极端干旱风险的水力或混合电力系统中的优势。

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