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首页> 外文期刊>War and society >Command, Leadership, and Doctrine on the Great War Battlefield: The Australian, British, and Canadian Experience at the Battle of Arras, May 1917
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Command, Leadership, and Doctrine on the Great War Battlefield: The Australian, British, and Canadian Experience at the Battle of Arras, May 1917

机译：大战战场上的指挥，领导和主义：1917年5月在阿拉斯战役中的澳大利亚，英国和加拿大经验

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摘要

The experience on the Somme in 1916, and the unprecedented losses suffered in the attempt to break through the German defences, forced the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to re-evaluate its attack doctrine. James Edmonds, the official historian of the British army in the Great War has stated, 'It is not too much to claim that the foundations of the final victory on the Western Front were laid by the Somme offensive of 1916'. Gary Sheffield reaffirmed this view more recently: 'The battle of the Somme was not a victory in itself, but without it the entente would not have emerged victorious in 1918'. Historical assessments of the Somme campaign are divided regarding the success and/or failure of the battle, but it is clear that the experience spurred efforts to correct the problems encountered in 1916. Infantry tactics, weapons, training, artillery, machine guns, command and control, communications, and support services were all adapted based on the lessons learned at the Somme. Only seven months after the catastrophic losses suffered on 1 July, the BEF embarked on it next major offensive at Arras. This article will examine the fighting on one day of the Arras offensive to analyse the evolution of the British Empire method of attack. On 3 May 1917 Haig ordered an attack by First, Third, and Fifth Armies astride the Scarpe River. At 0345 hours fourteen British, Canadian, and Australian divisions launched an assault against German positions in the Drocourt-Queant Switch and Hindenburg Line. By the end of the day all British divisions has been repulsed while the Australians maintained a toehold in the German line. Only the Canadians were able to capture and hold their objective. This article will argue that command and the application of doctrine made the difference between success and failure on that day.
机译：1916年索姆河战役的经历，以及企图突破德国防空所遭受的空前损失，迫使英国远征军（BEF）重新评估其进攻学说。英军在一次大战中的正式历史学家詹姆斯·埃德蒙兹（James Edmonds）表示：“可以说，在西线取得最后胜利的基础是1916年的索姆（Somme）进攻奠定的。加里·谢菲尔德（Gary Sheffield）最近重申了这一观点：“索姆河战役本身并不是胜利，但如果没有它，协约国就不会在1918年取得胜利”。对Somme战役的历史评估在战斗的成败上有分歧，但是很明显，这种经历促使人们努力纠正1916年遇到的问题。步兵战术，武器，训练，炮兵，机枪，指挥部和控制，通信和支持服务均根据在Somme上获得的经验进行了调整。在7月1日遭受灾难性损失之后仅7个月，BEF就在阿拉斯展开了下一次重大攻势。本文将研究在一天的Arras进攻中的战斗情况，以分析大英帝国进攻方法的演变。 1917年5月3日，黑格命令第一军，第三军和第五军进攻斯卡普河。在0345时，英国，加拿大和澳大利亚的14个师对德罗古特-奎因Switch和兴登堡线的德国阵地发起了进攻。到今天结束时，所有的英国师都被击退，而澳大利亚人则在德国线中保持了立足点。只有加拿大人才能抓住并坚持自己的目标。本文将论证说，命令和原则的运用在那天成功与失败之间产生了区别。

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