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A never-ending debate: demand versus supply water policies. A CGE analysis for Catalonia

机译:永无止境的辩论:需求与供水政策。加泰罗尼亚的CGE分析

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Water scarcity is a long-standing problem in Catalonia, as there are significant differences in the spatial and temporal distribution of water throughout the territory. There has consequently been a debate for many years about whether the solution to water scarcity must be considered in terms of efficiency or equity, the role that the public sector must play and the role that market-based instruments should play in water management. The aim of this paper is to analyse the advantages and disadvantages associated with different policy instruments, from both a supply and a demand viewpoint, which can be applied to water management in Catalonia. For this purpose, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, in which we introduce an ecological sector that allows us to analyse the environmental and economic impact of the alternative policies simulated. The calibration of the exogenous variables of the CGE model is performed by using a social accounting matrix (SAM) for the Catalan economy with 2001 data. The results suggest that taking into account the principle of sustainability of the resource, the policy debate between supply and demand in water policies is obsolete and a new combination of policies is required to respect the different values associated with water.
机译:在加泰罗尼亚,缺水是一个长期存在的问题,因为整个领土上水的时空分布存在显着差异。因此,关于是否必须从效率或公平性,公共部门必须扮演的角色以及市场手段在水资源管理中扮演的角色来考虑解决水资源短缺问题的辩论已有很多年了。本文的目的是从供需角度分析与不同政策工具相关的利弊,这些政策工具可用于加泰罗尼亚的水管理。为此,我们使用可计算的一般均衡(CGE)模型,其中引入了一个生态部门,使我们能够分析模拟的替代政策对环境和经济的影响。通过使用2001年数据的加泰罗尼亚经济社会核算矩阵(SAM)对CGE模型的外生变量进行校准。结果表明,考虑到资源可持续性的原则,水政策中供需之间的政策辩论已经过时,需要新的政策组合以尊重与水相关的不同价值。

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