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Waste Load Allocation in Rivers using Fallback Bargaining

机译:利用后备谈判在河流中分配废物

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In this paper, bargaining process between different stakeholders involved in a waste load allocation problem is simulated using the Fallback Bargaining (FB) concept. The paper considers two main parties in a waste load allocation problem. On the one hand, there are wastewater dischargers intending to minimize their treatment costs and on the other hand, there is an environmental protection agency which monitors the river water quality at a checkpoint downstream of the location of dischargers. In this paper, different alternatives which are combinations of dischargers' treatment scenarios are defined. A water quality simulation model is utilized to estimate the concentration of the water quality indicator along the river based on a selected alternative. If the concentration of water quality indicator in the selected checkpoint violates the water quality standards, a penalty function is used to calculate the amount of penalty assigned to dischargers. The allocated cost to each discharger is computed considering his treatment scenario as well as the penalty allocated to him. Two kinds of Fallback bargaining procedure termed as Unanimity Fallback Bargaining (UFB) and Fallback bargaining with Impasse (FBI), which both aim at minimizing the maximum dissatisfaction of bargainers in a negotiation problem, are utilized for finding a Compromise Set (CS) of alternatives. In this paper, the best alternative (alternatives) among CS members is (are) selected using a social choice theory namely Condorcet winner. The results of these two approaches are compared and the final alternative is selected which shows the initial Tradable Discharge Permits (TDPs) allocated to dischargers. Finally, in order to decrease the total allocated cost to dischargers, initial allocated TDPs are exchanged between them using the Extended Trading Ratio System (ETRS) developed by Mesbah et al. (Environ Model Software 24:238-246, 2009). The applicability and efficiency of the proposed methodology is investigated by applying it to a case study of the Zarjub River in the northern part of Iran.
机译:在本文中,使用后备谈判(FB)概念模拟了涉及废物负荷分配问题的不同利益相关者之间的谈判过程。本文考虑了废物分配问题中的两个主要方面。一方面,有一些废水排放者打算将其处理成本降至最低,另一方面,有一个环境保护机构在排放者下游的检查站对河流水质进行监测。在本文中,定义了排放者的治疗方案组合的不同替代方案。利用水质模拟模型,根据选定的备选方案估算沿河水质指标的浓度。如果所选检查点中的水质指示器浓度违反水质标准,则使用惩罚函数来计算分配给排放者的惩罚量。考虑到每个放电者的治疗方案以及分配给他的罚款,计算得出的分配成本。两种后备议价程序分别称为“统一后备议价协议(UFB)”和“有僵局后备议价协议(FBI)”,它们均旨在最大程度地减少议价程序中谈判者的最大不满,用于寻找替代方案的妥协集(CS) 。在本文中,使用社会选择理论(即Condorcet赢家)选择了CS成员中的最佳替代品(替代品)。比较了这两种方法的结果,并选择了最终方案,该方案显示了分配给排放者的初始可交易排放许可证(TDP)。最后,为了减少对排放者的总分配成本,使用Mesbah等人开发的扩展交易比率系统(ETRS)在排放者之间交换初始分配的TDP。 (环境模型软件24:238-246,2009)。通过将其应用于伊朗北部扎尔朱布河的案例研究,对所提出方法的适用性和效率进行了研究。

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