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Breaking anonymity of some recent lightweight RFID authentication protocols

机译：打破近期一些轻量级RFID身份验证协议的匿名性

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摘要

Due to their impressive advantages, Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems are ubiquitously found in various novel applications. These applications are usually in need of quick and accurate authentication or identification. In many cases, it has been shown that if such systems are not properly designed, an adversary can cause security and privacy concerns for end-users. In order to deal with these concerns, impressive endeavors have been made which have resulted in various RFID authentications being proposed. In this study, we analyze three lightweight RFID authentication protocols proposed in Wireless Personal Communications (2014), Computers & Security (2015) and Wireless Networks (2016). We show that none of the studied protocols provides the desired security and privacy required by the end-users. We present various security and privacy attacks such as secret parameter reveal, impersonation, DoS, traceability, and forward traceability against the studied protocols. Our attacks are mounted in the Ouafi-Phan RFID formal privacy model which is a modified version of well-known Juels-Weis privacy model.
机译：由于其令人印象深刻的优势，射频识别（RFID）系统在各种新颖的应用中无处不在。这些应用程序通常需要快速而准确的身份验证或标识。在许多情况下，已经表明，如果对此类系统的设计不当，则对手可能会导致最终用户的安全和隐私问题。为了解决这些问题，已经进行了令人印象深刻的努力，从而导致提出了各种RFID认证。在这项研究中，我们分析了无线个人通信（2014），计算机与安全性（2015）和无线网络（2016）中提出的三种轻量级RFID身份验证协议。我们表明，没有一个研究的协议可以提供最终用户所需的安全性和隐私性。我们提出了各种安全和隐私攻击，例如针对所研究协议的秘密参数泄露，模拟，DoS，可追溯性和前向可追溯性。我们的攻击被安装在Ouafi-Phan RFID正式隐私模型中，该模型是著名的Juels-Weis隐私模型的修改版本。

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