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Economic Integration and Rules of Origin under International Oligopoly

机译：国际寡头垄断下的经济一体化与原产地规则

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摘要

Free trade areas (FTAs) have rules of origin (ROOs) to prevent tariff circumvention by firms of non-member countries. In this paper, we have explored of ROOs in the framework of international oligopoly. In particular, we have pointed out an effect of ROOs which has been ignored in the existing literature. That is, ROOs lead to incomplete market integration (including market segmentation) for the firm located outside the FTA. Thus, ROOs generate two effects: the anti-tariff-circumvention and price-discrimination effects. The anti-tariff-circumvention effect is beneficial to the producer located in the FTA but is harmful to the producer located outside the FTA. On the other hand, the price-discrimination effect benefits the producer located outside the FTA. There is a case where the price-discrimination effect is harmful to the producer located in the FTA. Therefore, the net effect of ROOs on profits is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of these two effects.
机译：自由贸易区（FTA）具有原产地规则（ROO），以防止非成员国的公司规避关税。在本文中，我们在国际寡头垄断的框架内探讨了ROO。特别是，我们已经指出了ROO的作用，而现有文献中却忽略了它。也就是说，ROO导致位于FTA之外的公司的市场整合不完整（包括市场细分）。因此，ROO产生两种效应：反关税规避效应和价格歧视效应。反关税规避效应对位于自由贸易区的生产者有利，但对位于自由贸易区之外的生产者有害。另一方面，价格歧视效应使位于自由贸易区之外的生产者受益。在某些情况下，价格歧视效应对位于自由贸易区的生产者有害。因此，ROO对利润的净影响是模棱两可的，并且取决于这两种影响的程度。

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