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How do countries respond to anti-dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti-dumping

机译：各国如何应对反倾销申请？争端解决和报复性反倾销

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摘要

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti-dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti-dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic responsefiling a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti-dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti-dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti-dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.
机译：实证研究发现，各国可能会通过自己的报复行动对出口商提出的反倾销请愿做出战略性回应。尽管以前的大多数研究都集中在报复性反倾销申请上，但在本文中，我们探索了在世界贸易组织（WTO）争端解决谅解下进行战略性回应投诉的另一种潜在途径。我们使用1995年至2011年间的全球反倾销文件小组，分析了各国在何种条件下将选择通过反倾销请愿书或WTO争端进行报复，以及这两种策略在何种程度上是互补的或可替代的。我们发现统计证据表明，当各国也提交了报复性反倾销请愿书时，它们更有可能提出WTO争端，这表明这两种策略可能是相辅相成的。

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