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首页> 外文期刊>World trade review >'Flying High in a Plane' Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
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'Flying High in a Plane' Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft

机译：'飞翔在飞机上升'上诉机构报告，欧洲社区和某些会员国 - 影响大型民用飞机贸易的措施

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摘要

This article reviews the Appellate Body decision in the implementation phase of the EC-Aircraft dispute. Focusing on some of the key findings, we assess whether they are legally and economically correct. We conclude that (a) though still unclear, the test for establishing de facto contingency on import substitution subsidies is probably too demanding; (b) though legitimate, the interpretation of the remedy of removal of the adverse effects for actionable subsidies is the weakest and most deferential possible; (c) the hesitation in confirming that quantitative methods are the key tool to define the relevant market is unwelcome; and (d) the Appellate Body correctly recognize the importance for Panels to consider, in the context of the serious prejudice analysis, whether the like product of the complainant has been subsidized. Most importantly, the analysis of this case, set within the broader jurisprudence and practice, has led us to conclude that WTO subsidy disciplines are not particularly strong. The review of the main economic theories justifying subsidy control (strategic trade policy, terms of trade, private information, commitment theory) has shown that no single theory is able to fully account for subsidies and the need to control them. The key question is the definition of what we want to achieve by controlling subsidies, which is the main message sent to the policy-makers and negotiators that are currently considering law reform.
机译：本文审查了EC飞机争端实施阶段的上诉机构决策。专注于一些关键结果，我们评估它们是否合法且经济地是正确的。我们得出结论，（a）虽然尚不清楚，但在进口替代补贴的事实上应急的测试可能太苛刻; （b）虽然合法，对拆除可行补贴不利影响的补救措施的解释是最薄弱，最恭敬; （c）犹豫证实定量方法是定义相关市场的关键工具是不受欢迎的; （d）上诉机构正确认识到面板的重要性，在严重的偏见分析的范围内，申诉人的产品是否已被补贴。最重要的是，在更广泛的法学和实践中，对这种情况的分析导致我们得出结论，WTO补贴纪律并不是特别强劲。审查主要经济理论证明补贴控制（战略贸易政策，贸易条款，私人信息，承诺理论）表明，没有单一理论能够完全占补贴和控制它们的必要性。关键问题是通过控制补贴所希望实现的定义，该补贴是发送给目前正在考虑法律改革的政策制定者和谈判者的主要信息。

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  • 来源
    《World trade review》 |2020年第2期|316-340|共25页
  • 作者

    Crivelli Pramila; Rubini Luca;

  • 作者单位

    Goethe Univ Frankfurt Germany;

    Univ Birmingham Birmingham W Midlands England;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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