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Three Essays in Economics: Group Identity and Punishment, Human Capital Development, and Moral Hazard

机译:经济学的三篇论文:群体认同与惩罚,人力资本发展和道德风险

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摘要

This dissertation focuses on individual decision making with the presence of social interaction. In the first chapter, we design a lab experiment to investigate how group identity influences cooperation and peer punishment under the voluntary contribution mechanism of public goods. We find that monetary punishment leads to an increase in the public goods contributions, and the impact is greater in the treatments with groups than in the baseline without groups. In addition, participants punish ingroup under-contributors more severely. However, these effects are significant only when all the participants are made aware that the punishers' group identities are to be revealed to the punishees. In the second chapter, we conduct a field experiment in a large Chinese garment factory to investigate the impact of social distance on professional training efficiency. Our results show that closer social distance stimulates voluntary technology transfer from trainers to trainees. Furthermore, with one more technique transferred, an average trainee can produce more in the exit test of the training, showing that closer social distance between trainers and trainees promotes training efficiency. In the third chapter, we try to estimate the moral hazard effect of having health insurance on medical service spending, and the heterogeneity in it. We develop a theoretical model to illustrate the heterogeneity in the moral hazard effect, and then test it using the data from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. We find that the moral hazard effects of having health insurance are significantly greater for individuals who are 35 to 55 years of age, compared to individuals who are 20 to 35 years of age. They are also greater than individuals who are 55 to 64, but statistically insignificant. Moreover, we find that the moral hazard effects on outpatient visits decrease as individuals' family income increases. Our results thus indicate that a universal cost-sharing plan in health insurance policies may not be efficient.
机译:本文着重于存在社会互动的个体决策。在第一章中,我们设计了一个实验室实验,研究在公共物品的自愿贡献机制下,群体认同如何影响合作与同伴惩罚。我们发现,金钱惩罚导致公共物品贡献的增加,并且在有团体的情况下的影响要大于在没有团体的情况下的影响。此外,参与者会更严厉地惩罚小组内贡献者。但是,只有当所有参与者都知道要向被告揭露惩罚者的群体身份时,这些影响才有意义。在第二章中,我们在一家大型的中国制衣厂进行了实地实验,以研究社会距离对专业培训效率的影响。我们的结果表明,更近的社会距离会刺激自愿性技术从培训者向受训者的转移。此外,通过转让一项以上的技术,普通学员可以在培训的出站测试中获得更多收益,这表明培训者与学员之间更紧密的社交距离可以提高培训效率。在第三章中,我们试图估计拥有健康保险对医疗服务支出的道德风险影响及其异质性。我们建立了一个理论模型来说明道德风险效应中的异质性,然后使用俄勒冈州健康保险实验中的数据对其进行测试。我们发现,与20至35岁的个人相比,年龄35至55岁的个人拥有健康保险的道德风险影响明显更大。他们也比年龄在55到64岁但在统计学上无关紧要的个体更大。此外,我们发现,随着个人家庭收入的增加,对门诊就诊的道德风险影响也会降低。因此,我们的结果表明,健康保险政策中普遍采用的费用分摊计划可能并不有效。

著录项

  • 作者

    Yang, Shuo.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Texas at Dallas.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Texas at Dallas.;
  • 学科 Economic theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2018
  • 页码 149 p.
  • 总页数 149
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 康复医学;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:53:05

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