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Between Russia and Iran: Room to Pursue American Interests in Syria > National Defense University Press > News Article View

机译:俄罗斯与伊朗之间:在叙利亚追求美国利益的空间>国防大学出版社>新闻文章观点

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摘要

President Donald Trump has underscored containing Iran’s sway as a key element in establishinga “strong and lasting footprint” in Syria as the United States moves toward bringing itsSoldiers home. In pursuing this key American objective, this paper recommends that Washingtontake advantage of the “daylight” between Russia and Iran, and that it be American policy atall levels to work to expand it. This long-existing “daylight” was underscored in 2018 by calls inMoscow for Iran to withdraw its forces from some or all of Syria, and by Putin’s positive regardat the summit in Helsinki with President Trump for Israel’s security requirements. Russian acquiescence to U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian-associated and other forcesin Syria reinforces the conclusion that backing a dominant Iran is not one of President VladimirPutin’s priorities. However, while he will not forcefully oppose the United States and Israelconstraining Tehran, Putin will resist pressure to break totally with Iran and with the proxiesIran bankrolls and trains to fight in Syria. In addition, Russia’s leverage on Iranian military andpolitical activities in Syria is limited.Russia’s solution to its own dilemma of restraining Iranian behavior in the region has beenone of addition and mediation rather than subtraction. Moscow dilutes Iranian influence byworking with other powers, including those most antithetical to Iran. Russia’s relations withIsrael are now arguably closer to a “strategic partnership” than those with Iran. Russia’s dealingswith Saudi Arabia correspond more aptly to an “oil axis” than the “Shiite axis” description usedby some to characterize the ties between Moscow and Tehran. Russia’s economic ties and diplomacywith Turkey and greenlighting of Turkish military action in Syria against Kurdish forceshave also diluted Iranian leverage in Syria. America’s imposing military capabilities and veto-wielding membership in the United Nations(UN) Security Council will provide it and its allies with continuing leverage on developmentsin Syria. Putin ultimately will not be able to count on U.S. acceptance of any deal thatleaves Bashar al-Asad in place after a transition and new elections. Such an outcome would alsodash Russian hopes of significant American, European, and regional contributions to the immensecosts of reconstruction that lie ahead in Syria. Russia is unlikely to link its actions withthe United States in Syria to U.S. policy toward Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA) nuclear deal, or to U.S. sanctions on Russia. To attain the conditions that will make possible the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria,the United States needs to maintain a properly resourced military presence on the ground andin Syrian airspace. Only if it does so will Russia regard the United States as the most importantcounterweight to Iran with which Moscow will want and will need to deal. Even after the April13–14, 2018, U.S.-UK-French strikes on Syrian chemical weapons facilities, President Putinremained eager for talks with President Trump and addressed Syria at their summit in Helsinki.The Trump administration should therefore continue judiciously to engage Russia as the UnitedStates works toward the goals of assuring the defeat of the so-called Islamic State (IS), constrainingIran’s malign activities, bolstering Israel’s security, and deterring Syrian government use ofchemical weapons, without conceding anything in advance on Asad’s future or Iran’s place inthe region. This paper is based on information that was current as of August 1, 2018.11 The paper also draws on the author’s May 2018 visit to Moscow and previous visits andwork on this and related topics: John W. Parker, Russia and theIranian Nuclear Program: Replay or Breakthrough?Understanding Putin Through a Middle EasternLooking Glasspassim,Strategic Perspectives 25 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 2017), , available at <>

著录项

  • 作者

  • 作者单位
  • 年(卷),期 2019(),
  • 年度 2019
  • 页码
  • 总页数 94
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种
  • 中图分类
  • 网站名称 美国国防大学出版社
  • 栏目名称 所有文件
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  • 入库时间 2022-08-19 17:00:21
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