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Evidential reasoning in the prisoner's dilemma

机译：囚徒困境中的证据推理

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摘要

Classic game theory considers defection to be the rational choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Although defection maximizes a player's gain regardless of the opponent's choice, many players cooperate. We suggest that cooperation can be explained in part by expectations of reciprocal behavior, that is, by the belief that players facing the same situation probably will come to the same decision. In Experiment 1, expectations of reciprocity were experimentally manipulated. As predicted, cooperation increased monotonically with these expectations. In Experiment 2, experimentally manipulated expectations of opponent cooperation were not associated with higher rates of cooperation. These findings are interpreted in light of a general model of payoff maximization, and implications for other models (e.g., social value orientation) are discussed.
机译：经典博弈论认为叛逃是囚徒困境中的理性选择。尽管不管对手的选择如何，背叛都能使玩家获得最大的收益，但许多玩家还是合作。我们建议合作可以部分由对等行为的期望来解释，也就是说，相信面对相同情况的玩家可能会做出相同的决定。在实验1中，对互惠的期望通过实验进行了操纵。如预期的那样，合作以这些期望单调增加。在实验2中，实验操纵对手的合作期望与更高的合作率无关。这些发现是根据收益最大化的一般模型来解释的，并讨论了对其他模型的含义（例如，社会价值取向）。

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