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Minority physicians and selective contracting in competitive market environments.

机译:少数族裔医生和竞争激烈的市场环境中的选择性签约。

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摘要

This study used a framework of strategic behavior to further explore MCOs' physician contractual decision making. Using data from a cross-sectional mail survey of 1,215 physicians, we tested the assumption that a physician's patient profile is related to higher rates of contract denial or termination when adjusted and unadjusted for the level of managed care market competition. As minority physicians serve more minority patients who tend to have a poorer health status than white patients, we expected greater rates of contract denials and terminations for minority physicians when models are unadjusted for the level of market competition. In models adjusted for competition, we expected physician and patient race to be unrelated to MCO contractual decisions. We found physician ethnicity was not a predictor for contract denials or terminations, but patient ethnicity was a predictor for contract denials and terminations. When market competition is accounted for, the differences were almost unchanged.
机译:本研究使用战略行为框架进一步探讨了MCO的医生合同决策。使用来自对1,215位医生的横断面邮件调查的数据,我们检验了以下假设:在针对管理型护理市场竞争水平进行调整和未调整时,医生的患者档案与较高的合同拒绝或终止率相关。与白人患者相比,少数族裔医生为更多倾向于健康状况较差的少数族裔患者提供服务,因此,我们期望在未针对市场竞争水平调整模型的情况下,少数族裔医生的合同拒绝和终止比率更高。在针对竞争进行调整的模型中,我们期望医师和患者的种族与MCO合同决定无关。我们发现医师种族不是合同拒绝或终止的预测因素,但患者种族是合同拒绝和终止的预测因素。考虑到市场竞争,差异几乎没有变化。

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