• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Self-Regulation and Government Oversight
【24h】

Self-Regulation and Government Oversight

机译：自我监管和政府监督

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions.For example,in the U.S.the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers.We analyse one regulatory task of an SRO,enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers.Specifically,we model contracting/enforcement as a two-tier problem.An SRO chooses its enforcement policy:the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule.Given an enforcement policy,agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers' expected utility.We assume that the SRO's objective is to maximize the welfare of its members,the agents.We show that the SRO chooses a more lax enforcement policy-meaning less frequent investigations-than what customers would choose.A general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents.We also investigate government oversight of the self-regulatory process.The threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the SRO,just enough to pre-empt any government enforcement.
机译：自我监管是许多职业的特征。例如，在USTHE政府中，政府代表金融市场监管的各个方面，就像纽约证券交易所和国家证券经销商一样。我们分析一个SCRE的一个监管任务，强制性的防鲁蕾法则，所以代理商不会欺骗客户。特殊地，我们将签约/实施模拟作为两层问题。SRO选择其执法政策：为欺诈调查代理人和惩罚的可能性Shassion.given策略，代理通过提供最大化客户预期实用程序的合同竞争。我们假设SRO的目标是最大化其成员的福利，代理商。我们表明SRO选择了一个更加宽松的执法政策 - 意义频繁的调查 - 比顾客可以选择。一般的结论是控制执法政策的控制合同将大量的市场权力赋予了GR其他竞争性药剂。我们还调查了政府监督自我监管过程。政府执法的威胁导致SRO的更多执法，足以预先抢先任何政府执法。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号