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Analysis of individual strategies for artificial and natural immunity with imperfectness and durability of protection

机译：防属性和保护性耐用性的人工和自然免疫的个体策略分析

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As protection against infectious disease, immunity is conferred by one of two main defense mechanisms, namely (i) resistance generated by previous infection (known as natural immunity) or (ii) by being vaccinated (known as artificial immunity). To analyze, a modified SVIRS epidemic model is established that integrates the effects of the durability of protection and imperfectness in the framework of the human decision-making process as a vaccination game. It is supposed that immunized people become susceptible again when their immunity expires, which depends on the duration of immunity. The current theory for most voluntary vaccination games assumes that seasonal diseases such as influenza are controlled by a temporal vaccine, the immunity of which lasts for only one season. Also, a novel perspective is established involving an individual's immune system combined with self-interest to take the vaccine and natural immunity obtained from infection by coupling a disease-spreading model with an evolutionary game approach over a long period. Numerical simulations show that the longer attenuation helps significantly to control the spread of disease. Also discovered is the entire mechanism of active and passive immunities, in the sense of how they coexist with natural and artificial immunity. Thus, the prospect of finding the optimal strategy for eradicating a disease could help in the design of effective vaccination campaigns and policies. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：作为对传染病的保护，免疫由两种主要防御机制之一赋予，即（i）先前感染产生的抵抗（称为自然免疫）或（ii）接种疫苗（称为人工免疫）。为了进行分析，建立了一个改进的SVIRS流行病模型，该模型在人类决策过程的框架内，将保护的持久性和不完全性的影响集成为疫苗接种博弈。据推测，当免疫失效时，受免疫者再次变得易感，这取决于免疫持续时间。目前大多数自愿疫苗接种博弈的理论假设，流感等季节性疾病由临时疫苗控制，其免疫只持续一个季节。此外，通过将疾病传播模型与长期进化博弈方法相结合，建立了一个新的视角，涉及个体免疫系统与自身利益相结合，以接种疫苗和从感染中获得的自然免疫。数值模拟表明，较长的衰减有助于显著控制疾病的传播。还发现了主动免疫和被动免疫的整个机制，即它们如何与自然免疫和人工免疫共存。因此，找到根除疾病的最佳策略的前景可能有助于设计有效的疫苗接种运动和政策。（C） 2020爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。

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