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Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

机译:有限顺序游戏的Stackelberg平衡计算

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摘要

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e.,extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
机译:Stackelberg均衡是一个解决方案概念,描述了要承诺的最佳策略:Player 1(领导者)首先承诺公开宣布的策略,然后Player 2(追随者)对领导者的选择做出了最佳回应。 我们研究了有限顺序(即广泛形式)游戏中计算Stackelberg平衡的问题,并提供了新的精确算法,近似算法和硬度结果,以找到为几类这类两类游戏而言找到平衡的结果。

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