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Data on Industrial Engineering Detailed by Researchers at Benedictine University (A Trade-credit-based Incentive Mechanism for a Risk-averse Retailer With Private Information)

机译:工业工程的详细数据本笃会的大学的研究人员(一个Trade-credit-based激励机制风险规避零售商与私人信息)

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2021 MAY 03 (NewsRx) - By a News Reporter-Staff News Editor at Disease Prevention Daily- Research findings on Engineering- Industrial Engineering are discussed in a new report. According to news reporting from Lisle, Illinois, by NewsRx journalists, research stated, "In a two-tier supply chain composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer, we consider the retailer's sales cost to be private information and study the incentive effect of trade credit under information asymmetry. The model is formulated based on the principal-agent framework."
机译:2021年5月03 (NewsRx)——由一个新闻记者新闻编辑在日常疾病预防研究发现工程,工业工程讨论了一个新的报告。伊利诺伊州莱尔的报道,通过NewsRx记者,研究指出,“在一个两层风险中性供应商组成的供应链和风险规避零售商,我们考虑的零售商的销售成本是私人信息和研究贸易信贷的激励效应在信息不对称。制定基于委托代理框架。”

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