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Who is the most effective stakeholder to incent in the waste cooking oil supply chain? A case study of Beijing, China

机译：最有效的激励利益相关者是谁废食用油供应链吗?北京,中国

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Waste cooking oil (WCO) is one of the most promising feedstocks for biodiesel production as it is environment friendly, has energy supply potential, impacts edible oil safety, and enables competitive recycling costs. However, one central roadblock tothe development of WCO-based biodiesel in China is its fairly low collection rate in the formal WCO supply chain. Most waste cooking oil is still collected by informal collectors with some flowing back to "table." The aim of our paper is to identify themost effective incentive conditions and targets in the WCO supply chain to offer recommendations that address this WCO roadblock. Accordingly, we designed a Stack-elberg game model among restaurants, recyclers, and bio-diesel production enterprises. Theresults show that restaurants are the best targets for incentives in this WCO supply chain. With a certain amount of monetary incentives, the WCO supply for biofuel production can be improved significantly. If the restaurant subsidy is 4000 yuan/ton, theamount of WCO recycled would increase by 47%, which is far more efficient than incenting recyclers or biofuel producers. We also set up four scenarios and found that compared with a single policy approach (mandatory only or economic incentive only), a combined policy (mandatory with economic incentive) would be the most effective means to incent restaurants to submit WCO for biofuel. There was also a correlation between policy incentive effectiveness and restaurant sensitivity to WCO submission profits. When the price sensitivity was larger than 17.98, the best policy for the government would be to offer economic incentives to restaurants. To guarantee the effectiveness of such policyincentives, supporting laws, policy guidelines, and routine supervision should be provided as well.
机译：废食用油(海关组织)是一种最很有前景的生物柴油生产原料它是环境友好的能源供应潜力,影响食用油安全,使有竞争力的回收成本。路障WCO-based发展生物柴油在中国是相当低的在正式的海关组织供应链。食用油还收集的非正式的收藏家和一些流动回到“表”。我们的论文的目的是确定最有效的激励条件和海关组织的目标供应链提供建议解决这个海关组织障碍。设计了一种Stack-elberg之间的博弈模型餐厅、回收者、和生物柴油生产企业。在这个海关组织激励的最佳目标供应链。激励,生物燃料生产的海关组织供应可以明显改善。补贴4000元/吨,如果海关组织回收将增加47%,这得多效率比刺激回收或生物燃料生产商。发现,相比之下,一个政策的方法(强制只或经济激励)结合政策(强制性与经济激励)将是最有效的手段激励餐厅提交海关组织生物燃料。也有政策之间的相关性激励有效性和餐厅对海关组织提交的利润。价格的敏感度大于17.98,最好的政府将提供政策经济激励的餐馆。这种policyincentives的有效性,支持法律、政策方针、程序监督也应提供。

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