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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the European Economic Association >Priors Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help Or Hurt Incumbent Parties?
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Priors Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help Or Hurt Incumbent Parties?

机译：先验规则：渎职行为揭露何时对现任政党有利或有害？

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摘要

Effective policy-making requires that voters avoid electing malfeasant politicians. However, informing voters of incumbent malfeasance in corrupt contexts may not reduce incumbent support. As our simple learning model shows, electoral sanctioning is limited where voters already believed incumbents to be malfeasant, while information's effect on turnout is non-monotonic in the magnitude of reported malfeasance. We conducted a field experiment in Mexico that informed voters about malfeasant mayoral spending before municipal elections, to test whether these Bayesian predictions apply in a developing context where many voters are poorly informed. Consistent with voter learning, the intervention increased incumbent vote share where voters possessed unfavorable prior beliefs and when audit reports caused voters to favorably update their posterior beliefs about the incumbent's malfeasance. Furthermore, we find that low and, especially, high malfeasance revelations increased turnout, while less surprising information reduced turnout. These results suggest that improved governance requires greater transparency and citizen expectations.
机译：有效的决策需要,选民们避免选举行为不正的政客。通知现任渎职的选民腐败的上下文可能不会减少支持。选举制裁是有限的选民已经认为当权者是贪官污吏,而信息对选民的影响non-monotonic大小的报道渎职。墨西哥明智的选民对贪官污吏市长支出市政选举之前,测试是否适用于贝叶斯预测发展背景下,许多选民们差通知。干预现任得票率在增加选民拥有信仰和之前不利当审计报告引起选民欢迎更新后的信仰有关现任的渎职。低,特别是高渎职披露增加人数,而更少令人惊讶的信息减少人数。结果表明,改进的治理需要更大的透明度和公民的期望。

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